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I. Introduction: Calling for Good Science
Given the necessity of acting in the face of
enormous uncertainty, it is more important
than ever that our scientific analysis be rigor-
ous and the quality of data high.1
Public officials, agency managers, environ-
mental organizations, industry and the public
are frustrated. Debates over natural resources
are a common feature of the policy landscape
and the problems are increasing. Decision-
making related to California’s environment is
now more difficult because of the increasing
complexity of the relationships between that
environment and the economic and social
well-being of humans.
All too often, however, public officials, and
ultimately the public, lack a neutral source of
friendly facts to inform any stage of their deci-
sion-making. Public officials regularly
encounter politically motivated distortions of
science by interest groups to promote or
undermine programs or projects. “It’s no help
to get answers from one camp or the other. It’s
balance I’m looking for,” remarked one agency
manager.2 Agencies face challenges to the
legitimacy of their decisions. These continu-
ous, contentious challenges are major impedi-
ments to decision-making. “We’re frustrated,”
commented a senior official from a state regu-
latory agency, “we get the same questions
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again and again and we are forced to make
decisions in a vacuum because we cannot get
any scientific answers.”3
The same officials must increasingly make
decisions that embrace economic prosperity,
and preservation and restoration of vital natu-
ral systems—one compatible with the other.
The decisions often carry a high risk of lasting
harm to environmental quality, nature and the
economy.4
II. Where Science Can Provide Value
There are many practical advantages to
developing an enhanced scientific advisory
capacity. It provides a relatively low cost and
timely way for public officials to access the
most current, recognized and credible sources
of scientific information. It is a mechanism to
ensure that the palate of available options
offered to the public official are consistent with
the best available scientific information. It can
enrich the strong general expertise available in
public agencies.
Many natural resources issues now being
dealt with are complex problems that span
multiple spatial and temporal scales. A repre-
sentative from a federal management agency
commented, “we are moving from dealing with
water quality along a stream to water quality in
a watershed; and forest management less from
the standpoint of timber production and more
from the perspective of how to manage forest
resources to provide a range of goods and serv-
ices the public wants.”5
An enhanced science advisory capacity can
result in decisions that are more scientifically
and legally defensible. In 1998, Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer requested more scien-
tific information to help judges sort through
evidence. In response, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science is
now seeking funding to supply courts with that
expertise.6
The legislative branch sees no less a need
for enhanced technical and scientific capacity
to assist their decision-making, as evidenced
by the plethora of such bodies from New York
to Hawaii.7 A California legislator remarked
that questions of the environment are terribly
relevant and the need for objective analysis is
crucial.8
Because authority is highly decentralized
in the legislative, judicial and executive
branches, examining science and technology
issues in a single science advisory process can
help bridge mandates and responsibilities.
III. Challenges to the Effective Use of
Science
A. Boundaries for the Use of Science
The desire for good science strikes a reso-
nant chord in key institutions and among deci-
sion-makers. The note often sours when the
specific role science will play is discussed. It is
likely impossible to maintain a “bright line”
standard between the scientist as advisor and
the scientist as decision-maker in the current
environment. This situation presents a serious
dilemma for scientists and public officials.
Scientists interviewed for this article com-
plain public officials ask them for advice and
the next question is “can’t you change that a
little?”9 Public officials are equally frustrated
because there are policies and procedures for
taking action on advice provided by the scien-
tific panels. The public officials interviewed
remarked that the scientists have no idea how
the law works.10 
Nobody can reasonably expect to elimi-
nate public debate about issues by simply pro-
viding advice. These issues are hardly ever
purely technical disagreements, but reflect real
and profound differences in societal values
and priorities. A scientist who has led science
advisory panels bluntly stated that the mistake
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answers to problems or make choices clear.
“The choice is not really whether science will
tell us if we do take this action, we will destroy
the universe or if we don’t take the action, we
won’t; the choice is whether we really give a
damn. That’s not science, that’s people’s val-
ues.”11
A public official further clarified the bound-
aries for the use of science in decision-making,
noting, “It’s our job to make decisions based
on all the factors that need to be brought to
bear, scientific, economic and social. What we
want to know is if we are operating in a zone of
reasonableness, that is, the realm of credible
science? Scientific knowledge and wisdom are
needed to frame questions to be posed, pro-
vide assessments about current conditions
and evaluate the consequences of different
policy or management options.”12
B. Finding a Balance Between
Effectiveness and Independence
One of the greatest challenges to science
review is to strike a balance between inde-
pendence and effectiveness. There is no agree-
ment as to what constitutes “good science.” A
majority of the respondents interviewed for
this article commented, in one way or another,
that people say they want good science, but
what they really mean is they want their sci-
ence.13 The models presented in this article are
unswerving in their definition of good science,
which is that it be independent.  That said,
independent science review is difficult for
many to accept because the outcomes of that
review become less predictable.
In order to be most effective, the science
panels also should understand the context of
their decision-making. Bruce Smith believes,
for example, that the Science Advisory Board
(SAB) at the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) only became a truly
useful body to the agency after developing an
expertise in regulatory science.14 A 1993
Carnegie Commission report noted that ana-
lytical processes such as scientific advisory
panels should complement and not supersede
the capabilities in departments and agencies.15
C. Not All Science Is Created Equal
A closely related challenge to the disagree-
ment over what defines good science is that all
science is not created equal. Many organiza-
tions conducting “science-based” research
expect their findings to be accorded the same
weight as peer-reviewed research. To be truly
credible, science work must be peer-reviewed.
There is a large amount of pseudoscience pre-
sented to the public or to decision-makers.
This taints the process of review.
D. Selection
Selection of scientists is another example
of the difficulty of drawing that bright line.
Where selection is based too strongly on orga-
nizational affiliation, the selection process has
been criticized because those involved do not
always take a fresh look at the scientific
issues.16 However, there is an accepted practice
of interest group balancing that occurs in many
of the institutions that select scientific panels
that may surprise readers. An appropriate
selection process is the centerpiece of any sci-
entific advisory process.
IV. Science Advisory Panels and the Science
of the Panels Defined
A. How Does Scientific Review Work?
The actual scientific advisory process is
given different names in the literature, includ-
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review18 and peer review.19 It can be described
as a process of identifying and quantifying
potential risks and of making decisions about
how to deal with those risks by comparing var-
ious options and potential outcomes.
Qualified scientists trained in the scientific
method conduct this process by using accept-
ed scientific standards to evaluate the quality
of the data under review. Whatever the name,
the processes are designed to add to the cred-
ibility of the information being applied in poli-
cy-making and contribute to the legitimacy of
the overall decision-making process.20
B. Defining…Science?
The term “science” in this report is used in
its broadest form to include the physical, natu-
ral, life and social sciences, mathematics and
engineering. Natural resources are attributes
that constitute ecosystems and ecosystem
function. Environmental media are air, water,
soil and biota.21
V. Methodology
The research methodology used in this
article involved a literature review of perma-
nent and ad hoc science advisory programs
and panels. This article looks at seven perma-
nent models of scientific review and two ad hoc
science advisory models.
Formal and informal discussions and inter-
views were also conducted with more than 40
respondents who are producers or consumers
of scientific advice that represent science, gov-
ernment, industry and environmental organiza-
tions. Several themes were addressed in the
interviews, including:
1. The Role of the Science Advisor.
2. Building a Credible Science 
Advisory Process.
3. Housing the Institution. 
4. Funding the Institution.
A. Permanent Models of Science Advice
There are many institutional science advi-
sory models both permanent and ad hoc. The
permanent models tend to provide advice to
decision-makers on families of scientific issues
and create ad hoc review or assessment panels
to address specific scientific questions. The
examples selected and described below are
generally considered to be credible and inde-
pendent sources of scientific advice. The per-
manent models were explored based on simi-
larities and differences in mission, location,
funding and criteria for selection of scientists. 
1. The Science Advisory Board of the
United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the National Research
Council (NRC) are examples of federal sci-
entific advisory programs. These two insti-
tutions are interesting because the agen-
cies have strong mechanisms to help
develop appropriately scientific questions
and selection criteria.
a. The Science Advisory Board (SAB)
is housed in and administered by the
United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. Its mission is to “provide[]
expert and independent advice to the
[EPA] on the scientific and technical
issues facing the Agency.”22 It also func-
tions as a technical peer review panel
for the agency. The Environmental
Research Development and Demonstration
Authorization Act chartered the SAB in
1978.23 The SAB is  comprised of 97
non-federal scientists, economists and
engineers, and 300 consultants who
support the work of the executive com-
mittee and the 10 standing commit-
tees. The SAB is led by a staff director
and a deputy staff director. Both are
scientists. The average annual budget
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million. The agenda of the SAB is
developed based on requests from
Congress, the EPA Administrator, and
the regions, program offices and
departments of the agency. Ideas also
come from the membership of the SAB.
Questions addressed by the SAB are
formulated in concert with the EPA.24
The bases for selection of scien-
tists to serve on SAB committees are
education, training, experience and
credibility. However, the SAB is
charged by the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA)25 to achieve a
balanced panel. FACA defines an advi-
sory committee as a group or commit-
tee that is created by a federal agency
for advice or recommendations and
whose members include one or more
individuals who are not full-time feder-
al employees. Balance is defined as
seeking “a range of legitimate, techni-
cal opinion.” The SAB also attempts to
balance its committees on the basis of
geography, ethnicity, gender and aca-
demic/private sector representation.
No member of the SAB can be a full-
time federal employee. A conscious
effort is made by the SAB to avoid rec-
ommending members from the
extremes of scientific positions or who
take frequent public stands on issues
because these factors can undermine
objectivity.26 The intent of the selection
process is to assure that problems are
dealt with in a way that “transcends
federal agency or other organizational
boundaries.”27
b. The National Research Council
(NRC) is a non-profit organization
chartered by an executive order issued
by President Woodrow Wilson to
address the increased need for scientif-
ic and technical resources resulting
from World War I.28 The NRC is the pri-
mary operating agency of the National
Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering (the
Academies).29 The Academies are con-
cerned with the use of science, tech-
nology and engineering for the public
welfare and each serves as an advisor
to the federal government on those
issues.30 The mission of the NRC is to
provide advice on important public
policy questions for those entities. Its
most public and familiar role is to con-
vene committees and then publish
studies. The NRC staff works with the
Academies and with the individuals
initiating the review to reformulate
questions to be appropriately scientific. 31
Because the work of the Academies
and the NRC is so varied and their
budgets are combined in many key ref-
erence materials, it is difficult to calcu-
late the individual annual budget of
the NRC. Review of the 1996-97 com-
bined budgets of the three institutions
reveals the nature of their revenue
stream may help preserve their highly
valued independence. The revenue
stream is from multiple federal, private
and non-federal sources, including
grants, contracts and contributions.
The single largest source of funding is
from the federal government. Total fed-
eral sources in 1996-97 equaled $144
million. Grants and contracts from pri-
vate and non-federal sources including
foundations, corporations and the
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2000).
31. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, at http://www.nas.edu/
about/faq3.html, supra note 29; Survey, supra note 2.
from private and non-federal sources
only totaled $3.2 million.32
The Academies operate approxi-
mately 600 committees to advise the
government on technical issues rang-
ing from arms control to pest control.
The Academies and the NRC place a
great emphasis on professional com-
petence in relevant fields when devel-
oping their peer review panels. The
NRC uses selection factors that include
scientific expertise, reputation among
peers, ability to work in groups, and
writing skills. The NRC staff actively
solicits suggestions for candidates
from the committee members of the
Academies. Both NRC and the SAB
also use informal networking and
administrative discretion to achieve a
diversity of backgrounds and interests
on the panels and committees.33 A
number of scientists closely involved
with these committees have observed
that there seems to be a conscious
effort by NRC to have many points of
view represented.34
2. The Chesapeake Bay Program’s Science
and Technical Advisory Council and the
Michigan Environmental Science Board are
examples of scientific and technical guid-
ance in a multi-jurisdictional setting and
for a single state, respectively. A major dif-
ference between these and the federal pro-
grams is that elected or appointed leaders
make the scientific appointments.
a. The Chesapeake Bay Program
(CBP) is a regional partnership of
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the
District of Columbia and the Environmental
Protection Agency.35 The CBP’s mission
is to direct and conduct restoration of
the living resources of the Chesapeake
Bay. The Chesapeake Bay Agreement
chartered the organization in 1983.36
Staffing and funding for the CBP comes
from the National Estuary Program.
One major component of the CBP is
the Science and Technical Advisory
Council (STAC). For the past five years,
the average operating budget for STAC
has been $215,000. Approximately
$30,000 is also spent annually for work-
shops to address scientific and techni-
cal issues. Requests for scientific
advice come from the Executive
Council that is comprised of all key
members of the regional partnership.
The Executive Council generates many
questions addressed by STAC.  The
questions are also generated as a
result of public and media attention, or
by coalitions of interest groups. A vari-
ety of subcommittees comprise the
STAC. The subcommittees deal with
specific scientific issues affecting the
Chesapeake Bay such as Nutrients,
Toxics, Monitoring, Modeling and
Living Resources. The STAC
Workgroups address the scientific and
technical questions. The Workgroups
use technical conferences and work-
shops, technical reports and position
papers, literature synthesis and
reviews to assist them in their
work.37
The STAC has approximately 60
members and alternates from academ-
ic institutions, research institutions,
state and federal agencies and private
industry. Members are selected to rep-
resent a cross section of individuals
with diverse scientific backgrounds.
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Executive Council. There is a strong
emphasis on selecting scientists that
represent important institutions in the
region.38
b. The Michigan Environmental
Science Board (MESB) is an interesting
example of a state-chartered science
board with a permanent structure, but
with an ad hoc and very lean form of
operating. The MESB is an independ-
ent, autonomous state entity estab-
lished to provide sound scientific
advice to the Governor of Michigan and
to state departments “on matters
affecting the protection and manage-
ment of Michigan’s environment and
natural resources.”39 It was chartered by
an Executive Order of the Governor.40
Although it has no full-time staff, the
MESB is housed within and uses
employees on an as-needed basis from
the Department of Environmental
Quality, Office of Special Environmental
Projects, an executive agency of the
State of Michigan. The small annual
operating budget of $70,000 does not
reflect staff salaries. This budget is
paid by the Environmental Response
Fund which is comprised of money
resulting from penalties and fines
levied by the state. The MESB con-
venes only at the request of the
Governor to review a particular issue.
The executive agencies must route
requests for scientific review through
the Governor’s office. The MESB mem-
bership is mandated to have expertise
in one or more of the following areas:
science, economics, chemistry, physics,
toxicology and biological sciences,
human medicine, statistics, risk
assessment and geology. The Governor
appoints all MESB members. The ad
hoc panels are selected based upon
relevant expertise. Once the evaluation
is prepared and a recommendation is
delivered to the Governor, the work of
the MESB is complete.41
3. The Health Effects Institute (HEI) and
the University of California, Davis, Centers
for Water and Wildland Resources
(CWWR), are two models of “external” sci-
entific advice. One institution is an inde-
pendent research institute and the other is
university-based. The HEI is an interesting
model because of its strict selection stan-
dards for panels. Scientists are only drawn
from academia or research institutes to
preserve the independence of the institu-
tion. The CWWR is noteworthy from a fund-
ing perspective. It receives only a portion
of its budget from university sources. As a
result, it also accepts outside contracts.
Formulation of the initial scientific ques-
tion is not always in the hands of the sci-
entists. As a result, the process of science
review may be more agency-driven.
a. The Health Effects Institute is an
independent, non-profit institute
sponsored by the Environmental
Protection Agency and the automobile
industry to deal with the conflicts
between government and industry
regarding the health effects of mobile
source emissions by serving as both a
research broker and reviewer. Its mis-
sion is to provide “private and public
decision makers with independent,
unbiased, timely, and high quality sci-
ence on the health effects of emissions
from motor vehicles, fuels, and other
sources of environmental pollution.”
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39. MICH. ENVTL. SCI. BD., MESB MISSION, available at
http://www.mesb.org/mission.html#mission (last visited Oct. 17,
2000).
40. Mich. Exec. Order No. 1992-19, Michigan
Environmental Science Board (Aug. 6, 1992), available at
http://www.mesb.org/mission.html#execor (last visited Oct. 17, 2000).
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(1999).
changes or anticipate emerging ques-
tions affecting the field.42 The EPA and
automobile industry jointly and equal-
ly fund the $6.8 million annual budget.
Approximately $1.5 million of the total
budget is dedicated to reviews of HEI-
funded research, and special reviews
and projects. It costs an average of
$200,000-$400,000 to administer these
single purpose peer reviews.43 Special
reviews and projects are initiated by a
variety of sources including the HEI
board of directors, during the HEI
strategic planning process, by the
sponsoring organizations and the com-
munity. Expert committees are select-
ed based upon recommendations of
two independent committees of scien-
tists that oversee the work of the HEI.
The Health Research Committee
selects, guides and funds the research,
and the Health Review Committee pro-
vides evaluations of every HEI study.44
The HEI does not try to balance the
committees either by broad affiliation
or by relevant points of view. It con-
sciously avoids developing its commit-
tees on that basis. As discussed, scien-
tists are drawn from academia and
research institutes. The founders of
HEI did not want individuals with pre-
disposed environmental or industry
agendas participating in the pro-
grams.45
b. The University of California (UC),
Davis, Centers for Water and Wildland
Resources (CWWR) were formed, in
part, to create technical panels in order
to address statewide issues concerning
research needs, and resource conser-
vation and management of water and
wildlands. These institutions were
authorized by the California legislature
and established by the University of
California Regents or by action of a UC
President. The CWWR is comprised of
system-wide, multi-campus research
units. The average annual budget of
the CWWR is $2 to $6 million depend-
ing upon the number of research proj-
ects and contracts it undertakes each
year. It receives operating and program
funding from multiple sources. The
University of California provides the
basic operating budget of $1.3 million
from annual state appropriations. It
covers salaries for permanent staff and
administration. Project and research
funds for the CWWR come from a com-
bination of state, federal and private
sources. The Centers have oversight
boards comprised of University of
California academic representatives
that meet periodically to review the
policies, program activities and
finances of the Centers and are liaisons
to the University of California campus-
es. Scientists are selected from a broad
range of affiliations and include aca-
demic researchers, non-academic/pri-
vate scientists and public agency sci-
entists. The final composition of the
scientific teams depends upon the
nature of the project and the type of
question being considered for review.46
4. There is increasing interest in improv-
ing the integration of accurate and credible
scientific information from professional
scientific societies into environmental pol-
icy and management decisions.47 For exam-
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(last visited Oct. 18, 2000) (detailing USC initiative to dissemi-
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Social Contract for Science, 279 SCIENCE 491 (1998).
American Fisheries Society recently helped
in the selection of scientists for a statewide
salmon plan.48 The Society of
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry
has also developed a peer review program
for public and private initiatives.49
The American Institute of Biological
Sciences (AIBS) appears to be one of the
most active of the professional scientific
societies in peer review. Its mission is to
advance research and education in the bio-
logical, medical, environmental and agri-
cultural sciences. The AIBS, a federally
chartered non-profit scientific institution,
acts as an umbrella society for many of the
primary interest societies such as the
Ecological Society of America. The AIBS
Scientific Peer Advisory and Review
Services (SPARS) division conducts inde-
pendent and confidential peer reviews in
biological, environmental and biomedical
sciences. The SPARS activities are kept
independent of the other work of the AIBS.50
The annual budget for SPARS averages
$2 million. Contracts and cooperative
agreements fund peer reviews. It costs in
the range of $100,000-$200,000 to adminis-
ter single purpose peer reviews. The major-
ity of the projects involve reviews of
research proposals submitted to federal
agencies, although SPARS also provides
program monitoring and reviews draft
agency scientific documents and projects.
SPARS has a database of more than 8,000
scientists from which it recruits panel
members. SPARS staff selects the scien-
tists in concert with its consultants based
on given expertise in the topic area. Senior
retired scientists are consultants to the
organization and prepare reviews of the
final reports. There is an effort to maintain
a balance in the background of the individ-
uals selected to serve. The panels may
include scientists from industry, academia,
government agencies and non-governmen-
tal organizations.51
B. Similarities and Differences in the
Permanent Models of Scientific Advice
While there is no “one size fits all”
approach to developing a scientific advisory
program, there are more similarities than dif-
ferences in the models examined in this article.
The programs take precautions to avoid step-
ping into the regulatory realm, either by care-
fully formulating the questions to be clearly
scientific or by weighing in early in the process
before regulatory standard-setting occurs.
Most programs have multiple sources of fund-
ing from public and private sources. There are
frequently standing committees associated
with the permanent programs that serve as
“gatekeepers” for the institution. These gate-
keeper committees are a source of institution-
al memory and process, help select and formu-
late the questions, chose scientists for the ad
hoc panels and review final reports. Two of the
most significant differences are who charters
the institution and where the science advisory
programs are housed. They range from federal-
ly chartered and housed entities to university-
based enterprises. 
Scientists are selected first and foremost
based on their expertise to answer the ques-
tion.  A majority of the programs included in
this article attempt to balance committee rep-
resentation to a certain degree based on inter-
est groups, although scientists are expected to
deal with the questions using the scientific
method and expertise. Several models dis-
cussed in this article exclude government or
non-academic scientists, but these are excep-
tions rather than the rule.
C. Ad Hoc Models of Scientific Advice 
Ad hoc panels are stand-alone committees
that are generally created to address a discrete
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specific natural resource or technical problem.
Models described in this article include the
Interagency Scientific Committee to Address
the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl
and the Scientific Review Panel for Natural
Community Conservation Planning.
1. Interagency Scientific Committee to 
Address the Conservation of the 
Northern Spotted Owl
One of the early ad hoc science advisory
panels was the Interagency Scientific
Committee (ISC). The ISC was appointed by
interagency agreement and then chartered
under public law by Congress. The ISC charge
developed by the agencies was to create a
reserve system and management plan capable
of sustaining populations of the Northern
spotted owl. 52
The ISC was funded by four federal agen-
cies—Forest Service, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service and
National Park Service. The ISC had unlimited
access to data, staff and equipment from the
public agencies. The ISC was a very interesting
panel. It had a very central role in defining the
questions. Perhaps because it was among the
first panels and the power of this tool had not
yet been realized, its recommendations are
considered among the most scientifically pure
of the ad hoc panels. It had unrestricted access
to public agency resources. The scientists were
selected, in part, because of their specific back-
ground in conservation planning or with the
species and because they represented key public
and private interests. The ISC had a core team
of six agency scientists, with three additional
scientists participating from each of the affect-
ed states—California, Oregon and
Washington. One scientist from the timber
industry, a scientist from the environmental
community and a scientist from academia
completed the team. The scientists represent-
ing industry and the environmental communi-
ty were invited to observe the deliberations of
the core team.53
2. Scientific Review Panel for Natural 
Community Conservation Planning
The Scientific Review Panel (SRP) for
Natural Community Conservation Planning
(NCCP) was created to ensure that the ecosys-
tem-based planning and management goals of
the program to preserve the relic coastal-sage
scrub natural community and associated target
species, particularly the threatened and feder-
ally listed California gnatcatcher, were scientif-
ically justified.54 The SRP refined the assess-
ment to several key technical questions,
including how to define the overall and sub-
regional management planning areas and the
appropriate conservation framework for
reserve design.55 California’s Secretary for
Resources appointed a scientist to lead the
panel. A list of potential scientists was then
developed based on expertise. The environ-
mental and development communities were
also able to suggest candidates.56 The
California Department of Fish and Game was
the agency responsible for the SRP and funded
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3. Similarities and Differences in the 
Permanent and Ad Hoc Models of 
Science Advice
There are many similarities between the
two types of models. Comparable to perma-
nent panels, ad hoc requests generally come
from agencies or public officials. Scientists are
also selected based on expertise and knowl-
edge, with an attempt to balance the panels to
represent all relevant points of view. However,
in contrast with permanent models, ad hoc
panels are most often funded by exclusively
public sources. Additionally, stakeholders can
have a stronger direct role in problem formula-
tion and selection of scientists in the ad hoc
models.
VI. Ideas for Making a Science Advisory
Program More or Less Effective
A. Ideas for Building a Credible Science
Advisory Process.
1. Participants on Science Panels Must
Do More than Provide Cosmetic 
Balance. 
As discussed previously, institutional rep-
resentation does not always equal contribu-
tion.58 While many working models of science
review, including some described in this arti-
cle, strike a delicate balance of expertise and
affiliation, it is expertise and the ability to con-
tribute meaningfully to the final product that
must dominate in selection. To effectively meet
this objective, many science advisory pro-
grams, including the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Science Advisory Board and the
National Research Council, engage in an inter-
disciplinary selection process that directly
involves the scientific community. Consumers
of science advice use both institutions regular-
ly, and consider their reports and recommen-
dations to carry great weight. For example, the
Administrator’s report to the Science Advisory
Board indicates that the agency has acted
affirmatively on a majority of the SAB’s recom-
mendations.59
2. A Recommendation Is a 
Recommendation Is a 
Recommendation.
Challenges to agency science are a com-
mon feature of the administrative landscape in
California. This is not surprising. Agencies
operate in a very complex and constrained
environment. Legal mandates, legal defensibil-
ity, and the existing regulatory record drive
their decision-making. Where the stakes are
high it is hard to deliver a product that is satis-
factory to any interest group. Bureaucracies are
not places that encourage that risk-taking, cre-
ativity or “give and take” atmosphere that are
the hallmarks of the external science review
process.60 The flip side of this coin is that the
agencies sometimes attempt to change recom-
mendations. Participants in two advisory pan-
els in the western United States described sit-
uations where public agencies tried to modify
their draft recommendations. This caused an
outcry among the science panel participants.61
Moreover, this problem is not restricted to
California. In the early 1980s, the EPA
Administrator challenged the independence of
the Health Effects Institute. At that time, the
Administrator tried to influence the agenda
and priorities of the HEI.62 Sheila Jasanoff also
describes manipulation of scientific data to
suit predetermined policy aims in chemical
regulation.63 Recommendations must not be
subject to change by the staff if the credibility
of the scientific enterprise is to be maintained.
3. Use Panels Sparingly. 
The job of science advisor is very special-
ized. It is important to have scientists on the
panels with an interdisciplinary bent who
understand administrative process. Several
scientific respondents indicated that they have
many more invitations to participate on panels
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scholars recommend that scientific panels be
used sparingly (and only for the most impor-
tant issues) to avoid draining scientific
resources or creating another layer of bureau-
cracy that delays decisions.65
4. Use Panels Well. 
All the models described in this report
consciously try to avoid any effort to get them
to define regulatory goals, set regulatory stan-
dards or manage regulatory risk. This is the job
of the agencies. It is neither reasonable nor
possible to answer every question asked. 
To streamline the process and avoid irreg-
ularities, question development should follow
several guidelines. First, questions should be
asked at the earliest stage of a problem to
allow scientists to offer guidance well in
advance of actual decision-making. Second,
questions should be dealt with when there is
sufficient information to evaluate the technical
merits of an issue based on standards of scien-
tific proof. Third, questions should be
addressed of the utmost importance to the
agency such as when a decision carries a high
risk of lasting harm to environmental quality,
nature, the economy and communities. Fourth,
questions should be asked when science is
controversial, in dispute or inadequate. Finally,
the actual format of the questions is signifi-
cant. Questions should be formulated in small
sets of very focused scientific questions that
are answerable in a reasonable time-frame.
B. Defining the Role of the Science
Advisor.
1. Bridge the Gap Between Scientists 
and Public Officials.
Peter Douglas, Executive Director of the
California Coastal Commission, a California
regulatory body, identifies six variables that
any policy-maker needs to use science effec-
tively in his or her decision-making. These vari-
ables are: 1) timely information; 2) credible
information; 3) an understanding of the limita-
tions of the science; 4) identification of the
additional questions to be answered; 5) a clear
explanation of conclusions drawn; and 6) the
resources required to provide the additional
information.66
The different models described in this arti-
cle show that a lack of understanding between
the scientist and the public officials can be
bridged if there is early discussion about the
scope of the review and a clear statement of
the problem. While this would seem to be a
given, it was astounding how many respon-
dents commented that everyone had to work
harder to clarify exactly those issues in order to
develop a relevant product.67
2. Define the Advisory Function 
Clearly.
Many scientific respondents remarked that
when public officials and agencies did not like
their recommendations the advice was ignored
or that it had a small role in the final decision-
making. Respondents from public agencies
were universal in their view that science panels
can only provide guidance and direction. It is
up to the policy-maker to make the final call.
The Science Advisory Board at the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency has a unique approach to
solving this problem. While the SAB can only
offer non-binding recommendations, the EPA
Administrator has to respond to all reviews.
The majority of the responses from the
Administrator indicate that the agency has
acted positively on the advice provided by the
SAB.68 This seems to be a very effective
approach for providing feedback to the scientists.
3. Formalize the Program in the 
Agencies.
Government, often with the involvement of
key interest groups or public officials, formally
chartered all the institutions and panels
described in this article. Formal, individual
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for triggering scientific review should be creat-
ed with relevant state and federal regulatory
and management agencies in the key natural
resources areas. The agreements should spell
out the mission, anticipated role, broad areas
of inquiry and mechanisms for initiating the
committees by the agency. The agreement
should also stipulate that the recommenda-
tions are to be delivered to the highest appro-
priate level in the agency.
C. House the Institution Where It Can
Capitalize on Existing Scientific
Resources.
There are different forms of permanent sci-
entific advice located inside and outside of
government. The desired home for this enter-
prise is in an existing and credible institution
with established links to the scientific research
establishment. This will allow the institution to
capitalize on those relationships and to make
it more cost-effective.
D. Provide a Committed Source of
Government Funding.
Because a science advisory institution is a
public good, it should reasonably receive a
majority of its funding from government. From
the small subset of models examined, govern-
ment funding largely supports the work of sci-
ence advisory panels.69 Without this funding,
the institution may become too reliant upon
single sources and contracts. Fundraising takes
time away from the primary work of scientific
assessment. Question formulation becomes
driven by contracts. The credibility of the insti-
tution can be compromised. To avoid these
problems, government should commit to at
least two-thirds of the operating budget and
the institutional endowment. A third of the
budget could be sought from multiple sources
including private foundations, the National
Science Foundation, individual public agencies
and consortiums of affected industries.
This article makes no claim to have all the
answers or to identify all the steps necessary to
provide more policy relevant scientific infor-
mation. Instead, it lays out in broad strokes
some of the challenges to achieving that
vision. Going forward and building this new
community of scientists for California will
require a commitment of time and resources in
many areas.
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